Conjugating ALARA, BEPU, Safety Margins and Independent Assessment in Nuclear Reactor Safety by D’Auria, F. et al.
1 
 
Invited at Plenary Session of “Safety Assurance of NPP with VVER”, OKB “GIDROPRESS”, Podolsk 16-19 May, 2017 
ISBN 978-5-94883-147-3 OKB”GIDROPRESS”            
Conjugating ALARA, BEPU, Safety Margins and Independent Assessment in Nuclear 
Reactor Safety 
F. D’Auria1, N. Debrecin2, H. Glaeser3 
1 University of Pisa (DESTEC/GRNSPG), Pisa, Italy; 2 University of Zagreb (FER), Zagreb, Croatia;  3 
Consultant, Eching, Germany 
 
ABSTRACT 
ALARA (As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable) is an early principle in Nuclear Reactor Safety, NRS (Nuclear 
Reactor Safety): Designers and Operators must do their best to minimize doses to the humans. BEPU (Best 
Estimate Plus Uncertainty) is an approach in Accident Analysis, part of NRS: one may state that BEPU 
implies the best use of computational tools to determine the safety of nuclear installations. Then, ALARA 
may be seen at the origin of BEPU, or ALARA is at the origin of BEPU. Furthermore, BEPU (and BEPU 
elements like V & V, Scaling, procedures of code application and code coupling, etc.) can be extended to all 
analytical parts of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This brings to BEPU-FSAR. Safety Margin (SM) is 
an established concept in NRS: a few dozen SM values must be calculated in current safety analyses and 
demonstrated to be acceptable.  The SM concept can be extended to everything part of the design, the 
operation and the environment for a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Unit. Here the environment includes the 
personnel in charge of activities connected with the NPP.  The Extended SM concept, E-SM, implies the 
formulation of some ten-thousands SM values, which shall correspond to a similar number of monitored 
variables. Reasons for E-SM are the examples in section 4.1. Independent Assessment (IA) is an early 
requirement in NRS: data ownership and system complexity prevented so far a comprehensive application 
of the requirement. IA analyses conflict with industry policies to keep proprietary data. IA based BEPU-FSAR 
analyses are essential to finalize the E-SM design.               
In the paper we discuss that: a) ALARA is at the origin of BEPU; b) BEPU-FSAR analyses are the natural origin 
of E-SM values; c) The implementation of E-SM equals to introducing an additional physical barrier against 
the release of fission products.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear Reactor Safety constitutes a well-established technology at the time of writing this paper. About 
five-hundred Nuclear Power Plant units have been operated since the demonstration of the capability to 
control the fission reaction. A much larger number of reactors (a few thousands) have been constructed 
and successfully operated for purposes different from electricity production including research and 
production reactors as well as reactors used for marine propulsion. Accidents occurred, including a few 
catastrophic ones which severely impacted the exploitation of the nuclear technology.    
Two paradoxical situations can be identified for NRS: first, maturity was achieved at a time when the 
number of NPP units commissioned-constructed per year sharply dropped mainly as a consequence of the 
2 
 
accidents in Three Mile Island (TMI-2) and in Chernobyl; second, industrial interest in implementing 
research findings and new ideas after those events declined leading to a sort of misalignment between 
technological capabilities and implementation status. Furthermore, human factors are part of NRS and had 
a key role in the evolution of the occurred nuclear catastrophes: these are marginally or indirectly 
considered hereafter.   
Concepts and principles in NRS were proposed by those pioneers who developed the nuclear technology in 
the middle of the past century and since then are embedded into any step of the process leading to 
electricity production. Those concepts and principles were adopted by other technologies later on and, still 
today, appear unsurpassed. The implementation of those concepts and principles shall follow the progress 
in understanding and the development of new techniques.  
The starting point for the proposal formulated in the present paper is the growth in knowledge in nuclear 
thermal-hydraulics during the last three decades of the previous century, noticeably including application 
to the accident analysis in NPP. Accomplishments like validation of numerical tools, characterization of 
errors in computation or uncertainty quantification and addressing the scaling issue were established and 
formed the Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) approach.  
BEPU constitutes an established approach for the consistent application of system thermal-hydraulics 
codes within the licensing process of NPP. This has been developed within the framework of the Accident 
Analysis part of the Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA); more insights are provided in the paper. In 
addition attempts have been made even by international institutions to merge the DSA developed BEPU 
approach with Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). The first example is constituted by the SMAP and the 
follow-up SM2A activities performed by the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI, part of 
Nuclear Energy Agency, NEA, within the Organization for Economic Development, OECD), i.e. Zimmermann, 
2011: when performing those activities, fault sequences and parameters are not enveloped or bounded; 
rather, the transients are analyzed using a BEPU approach and discarding of events in the Event Tree (ET) is 
avoided as far as practicable. The second example is the ASAMPSA project within the European Commission 
(EC), EC-EURATOM, 2013: in this case the BEPU quality was proposed for PSA level 2 calculations and 
evaluation of consequences. The third was the follow-up of activities performed within the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): it aimed, see e.g. Dusic et al., 2014, to the integration of DSA and PSA 
activities making reference to the so-called risk-informed regulation and to the ‘option-4’ to perform NRS 
analyses.      
All those attempts are valuable and shall be considered as background other than providing inspiration for 
the development proposed in the present paper. The following is also noted: 
a) The As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) principle, proposed for bounding the radiation 
impact upon the humans, is consistent with the practice of best use of existing information, i.e. a 
feature of BEPU, D’Auria, 2017. 
b) The methods and the procedures which are part of BEPU can be extended to any sector of NRS 
where analytical processes are adopted, Menzel et al., 2015. 
c) The safety of NPP is expressed in terms of Safety Margins (SM), i.e., for an assigned parameter, the 
difference between the imposed threshold and the current value which characterizes the system 
(the NPP in the present case) status. BEPU is the best way to estimate the current value and then 
the SM value. The actual SM space can be extended, i.e. introducing the E-SM development, 
D’Auria et al., 2015, covering each logical process within NRS. 
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d) Independent Assessment (IA) is an early requirement in NRS: however, the needs derived from 
industrial property and the sophistication of NPP may prevent its implementation, D’Auria & 
Debrecin, 2014.    
The objective for the present paper is to consider as cornerstone elements the ones listed at items a) to d) 
and to derive a new vision for NRS. The end result is the creation of a barrier to the release of fission 
products which is in addition to those constituted by clad, pressure boundary and containment. The new 
barrier has a dynamic nature and a financial worth close to 1% of the value of one NPP unit; the installation 
of this barrier would have prevented severe evolution of TMI-2 and Chernobyl-4 accidents and, possibly, of 
Fukushima-1 to -4, under proper circumstances.    
 
2. THE CONCERNED PRINCIPLES, CONCEPTS AND REQUIREMENTS IN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY   
The dream to synthesize NRS in a paper is not pursued in the paper. However, a skeleton interpretation is 
provided which may guide through the logical path followed to link principles, concepts, requirements and 
outcomes from analyses including the proposal for devoted hardware.       
The Nuclear Reactor Safety Technology may be perceived as entailing two main parts, the Fundamentals 
and the Application, Fig. 1. An idea of the complexity of the matter can be derived from IAEA, 2000, 2006 
and 2009. 
 
Fig. 1 – Simplified sketch for Nuclear Reactor Safety 
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The Fundamentals in Fig. 1 include the key safety objective, i.e. to protect people and environment from 
ionizing radiations, and the related safety principles and safety requirements according to established IAEA 
nomenclature. The Application makes reference to whatever is done for the design, the licensing (e.g. see 
IAEA, 2000), the construction, the displacement, the operation and the decommissioning of any nuclear 
installation involving the presence of radioactive material. Hereafter specific reference is made to NPP 
equipped with water-cooled reactors.     
The bases and the procedures which constitute the established Defense in Depth (DiD) framework shall be 
seen as the link between NRS Fundamentals and Application. Prevention and Mitigation shall be 
distinguished in this connection and DiD procedures apply in relation to both.  
The design, construction and operation of any nuclear facility, noticeably a NPP, implies the existence of a 
process within NRS originated by the safety objective. Acceptable safety and/or design margins shall be 
demonstrated for each step of the process in compliance with the safety Fundamentals. The safety margins 
imply the reference to acceptance criteria which are established by devoted institutions, typically 
Regulatory Authority in the Country where the facility is installed. Principles like Fail-to-Safe and As-Low-As-
Reasonably-Achievable are part of the overall picture. 
The accomplishment of safety fundamentals in the NPP design is demonstrated by safety analysis and 
assessment. Parameters characterizing the pink blocks part of the NPP Hardware & Software are object of 
calculations performed within the context of Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) and Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA). Then, the safety functions are ensuring the integrity of the safety features and barriers. 
Prevention and mitigation shall be considered as key elements of the Defense in Depth. 
A comprehensive Safety Analysis Report (also known as Final Safety Analysis Report, FSAR) for an individual 
NPP provides the demonstration that the safety objective is met and, noticeably, that acceptable values for 
SM exist. 
2.1 The ALARA principle 
ALARA, according to USNRC (Code of Federal Regulation, title 10, part 20 – Standards for Protection against 
Radiation) means “making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the dose limits in 
this part as is practical consistent with the purpose for which the licensed activity is undertaken, taking into account 
the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to state of technology, the economics of 
improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic 
considerations, and in relation to utilization of nuclear energy and licensed materials in the public interest”. The close 
connection with ‘Radiation’ and with ‘the state of technology’ shall be noted.  
2.2 The Safety Margin concept and the E-SM  
The safety margin for nuclear reactors is defined as the difference or the ratio in physical units between the 
limiting value of an assigned parameter (typically, the threshold value for the connected acceptance 
criterion) the surpassing of which leads to the failure of a system or component, and the actual value of 
that parameter during the life of the plant. 
The existence of suitable margins ensures that nuclear reactors operate safely in all circumstances during 
their life. Sample safety margins relate to physical barriers designed to protect against the release of 
radioactive material, such as fuel matrix and fuel cladding (typical limiting values are associated with 
Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio [DNBR], fuel temperature, fuel enthalpy, clad temperature, clad 
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strain, clad oxidation), to reactor coolant system boundary (pressure, stress and material conditions related 
values), to containment (e.g. pressure and temperature) and to dose to the public being close or far from 
the NPP.  
The accident phenomenology and the related timing are estimated as complete as necessary within the 
DSA framework. In turn, the PSA approach allows demonstration of the completeness of the set of different 
scenarios and best estimate methods. The concepts of safety margins and of quantifying changes in safety 
margins appear as key components of the discussions for modifications in plant design parameters and 
operational conditions. This includes, for example, power up-rates, life extensions, use of mixed oxide fuels, 
different cladding materials, design and operation of passive systems and changes to technical 
specifications. Those modifications impact safety margins in deterministic analyses, while others impact the 
reliability of systems and components, and yet others impact safety margins and reliability simultaneously. 
The concepts of ‘Safety Margin (SM)’ and ‘Design Margin (DM)’ are characterized from well-established Fig. 
2. The concepts ‘Safety Limits’ and ‘Licensing Margins’ are also relevant here.  
 
Fig. 2 – Acceptance Criteria, Licensing & Safety / Design Margins and connection with Safety Limits and 
results of Safety Assessment calculations. 
The concepts of SM and DM are expected to be introduced in relation to the following topics (minimum list, 
to be taken as example and excluding security related issues): 
- the control of the ‘nuclear chain reaction’; 
- the amount of ‘radioactive source’; 
- the ‘likelihood of an accident’; 
- the prevention of (each among several) ‘failures’ of systems and components; 
- the prevention of (each among several) ‘possibility of escalation’ of any off-normal condition of 
operation; 
- defending (each among several) the Barriers and the Safety Features (see below) introduced ‘to 
prevent loss of radioactivity’.    
2.2.1 The multi-dimensional space to evaluate E-SM  
The DSA and PSA approaches have been developed rather independently from each other. This poses the 
problem of consistent integration. Hence, a generalization of the concept of safety margin may be 
beneficial. This shall be given within a multidimensional space. The multidimensional space implies a multi-
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face concept, because of the many design-safety-licensing involved aspects, and a multi-field concept, 
because of the many involved technological fields covering nuclear reactor safety and design.  
The multidimensional space can be defined for SM, noting that risk space shall be taken as synonymous of 
safety space.  The key dimensions for the space embracing the definition of SM can be defined as: 
A) The key elements characterizing NRS.  
B) The technological sectors or the key scientific disciplines of NRS and NPP design and operation. 
C) The systems, the sub-systems and the components which constitute the NPP. 
D) The time spans which form the life of the NPP.  
Human factors shall be considered as part of any of the ‘dimensions’ above. Key elements are defined for 
each dimension hereafter: 
A1) Safety Principles, i.e. SP-1 to SP-10, i.e. according to established document (e.g. IAEA framework). 
A2) DiD Levels, i.e. DL-1 to DL-5, i.e. according to established document (e.g. IAEA framework). 
A3) Safety Barriers, i.e. SB-1 to SB-6, i.e. according to established document (e.g. IAEA framework). 
A4) Safety Functions, i.e.SF-1 to SF-19, i.e. according to established document (e.g. IAEA framework). 
A5) PSA Elements, i.e. PE-1 to PE-n, i.e. according to results of BEPU-based safety analysis (see below). 
A6) DSA Elements, i.e. DE-1 to DE-m, i.e. according to results of BEPU-based safety analysis (see below).   
The values ‘m’ and ‘n’ shall be associated with the results and the procedures of the applicable DSA and 
PSA.  
B1) Radio-Protection; 
  B2) Thermal-Hydraulics; 
  B3) Structural Mechanics; 
  B4) Neutron Physics; 
  B5) Civil & Electrical Engineering. 
An attempt is made to minimize the number of disciplines. Several SM and DM are expected in relation to 
each discipline.         
                     C1) Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV); 
C2) Reactor Coolant System (RCS) piping; 
C3) Balance of Plant (BOP) piping;  
C4) Core; 
C5) Core components; 
C6) RPV components except core; 
C7) RCS components; 
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C8) BOP components; 
C9) Containment; 
C10) Containment components; 
C11) Core components;  
C12) Reactor building; 
C13) Auxiliary buildings; 
C14) Reactor building and auxiliary building components; 
C15) Site (parameters); 
C16) Site structures and components; 
C17) Off-site (NPP related relevant parameters); 
C18) Off-site structures and components (NPP related); 
C19) Instrumentation and Control (I & C) . 
The value ‘19’ associated to the identification of systems, sub-systems and component of the NPP is 
somewhat arbitrary. Modification in this number will not affect the procedure. Furthermore, each of the 
listed items should be intended as Ci-j where ‘i’ ranges between 1 and 19 (present proposal) and ‘j’ can 
assume any value connected with the level of detail of the analysis.     
  D1) Site selection; 
D2) NPP design; 
D3) NPP construction; 
D4) NPP licensing; 
D5) NPP operation; 
D6) NPP maintenance; 
D7) NPP decommissioning. 
The items from D1) to D7) should be considered as an outcome of the established knowledge of NRS and 
NPP technologies. 
Thirty-five (35) E-SM tables are generated which constitute the multidimensional E-SM matrix, IAEA, 2015. 
The use of the matrix can be explained with the help of the sketch in Fig. 3.  The figure has been obtained 
assuming non-dimensional E-SM definition related to non-dimensional acceptance criteria which are set at 
the unity value. In relation to each safety barrier and safety function, ‘n’ E-SM values can be defined. 
Furthermore, one average E-SM can be created per each safety barrier and each safety function. Finally, 
one average E-SM can be created as a function of time per each NPP, specifically following any modification 
or any (relevant) operational event.  
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Fig. 3 – Application of the E-SM matrix. 
A number of ‘new’ detectors of the order of 104 is expected to be installed for continuously monitoring the 
safety margins part of the E-SM matrix. Examples of measured quantities include the stem position of all 
valves and those quantities which are the result of BEPU-FSAR analyses (see below); examples of detectors 
are cameras installed along various circles around the NPP unit.  
The application of the procedure according to the diagram in Fig. 3 also requires establishing the ranges 
‘safe’, ‘acceptable’ and ‘close to the limit’. Once this is completed, the objective safety status for the 
concerned NPP can be evaluated at each instant of the life. 
2.3 The Independent Assessment requirement 
The legal branch of NRS is known as licensing. A licensing process is initiated each time the construction is 
planned of a new nuclear installation where radioactive material is present. The licensing process aims at 
ensuring the safety of each NPP unit, as well as at protecting the public and the environment from harmful 
radiations. A Government Body under the control of a Ministry, typically Industry or Safety-Security 
Ministry, is responsible for the licensing process and dictates the modalities which (typically) are part of the 
Atomic Energy Act and of the Laws. The Government Body is known as licensor. The licensor must approve 
the safety demonstration prior to the start of the operation of a facility. On the other side, there is the 
owner of the nuclear installation or facility, which is, typically, the operator of the concerned NPP unit or 
the applicant of the licensing process. The operator is known as licensee. The operator must fulfill all the 
obligations set by the licensor, namely making available any information detail and data related to the 
facility. 
In between the licensor and the licensee, there are typically other organizations, or institutions, or 
individuals: examples are the NPP designer and vendor, consultants including technical support 
organizations and research bodies including universities. Those ‘other organizations’ cooperate either with 
the licensor or with the licensee to finalize the licensing process.            
Looking at the above terms the licensing process constitutes a perfect process and there is no room for 
improvement. However, in order to undermine the concept of perfect process, also showing its 
complexities, let’s consider the following facts (just three out of more possible examples):        
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a) In order to demonstrate the safety of NPP, analysts need to calculate temperature and stresses 
in individual fuel pins (thickness of the clad is few tenths of mm) solving a multi-scales and multi-
physics problem; providing an analogy in aeronautics, the given problem is similar to 
demonstrate the integrity of a crystal glass glued on the wing of an airliner following a cycle 
take-off / trip under any meteorological condition / landing.  
b) There is evidently no countermeasure for the falling of a meteorite upon a nuclear facility. The 
falling in the region around the facility may also generate earthquake and tsunami beyond the 
design limits of the facility. The issue here is that the probability value for meteorite falling may 
have changed (i.e. because of new evidence became available) after the facility has been put in 
operation. 
c) Most of the NPP units now in operation have been designed at a time when computers and 
computational tools and methods were not available. The obvious question arises on how the 
new findings can be integrated in the old designs.   
Furthermore, it is part of the human nature to optimize any aspect, which may generate a benefit: this is 
the basis of progress of civilization. Therefore, designers continuously improve the system and regulators 
continuously improve the techniques to check the design. Independent assessment (IA), i.e. the safety 
evaluation made by licensor knowing the construction data of the facility and adopting methods 
‘independent’ of the licensee, constitutes the foundation of the licensing process (USNRC, Code of Federal 
Regulation, title 10). 
So, where is the weakness?  
In the attempt to address the question, two items are considered: 
• Modifications introduced by industry are not always and systematically requested by regulators for 
the independent assessment: in the given example, the type of glue used to attach the glass to the 
wing may produce unexpected effects.   
• New analytical techniques and related capabilities as well as new evidence are not necessarily used 
in the analyses by regulators and by the industry; for instance any impact in safety demonstration is 
calculated from the change in probability of a meteorite fall.  
The experience gained in a recently completed effort to demonstrate the safety of an NPP in parallel to the 
safety demonstration provided by the designer helped in answering the question “Where is the weakness?” 
The concerned effort is the licensing process of Atucha-2 in Argentina. A ‘vendor-independent’ safety 
analysis was needed including accident analysis. The new safety evaluation was completed and approved 
by the licensor. The facility detailed construction data and the latest computational techniques (available 
thirty years after the time of design of the facility) were adopted: this implied, among the other things, the 
use of the BEPU approach (section 3), e.g. D’Auria et al., 2012, and the design and operation of an 
experimental facility, Moretti et al., 2016.  
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The diagram in Fig. 4 is taken from the effort to prepare the IA based Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for 
Atucha-2, D’Auria et al., 2012a.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 - Results from AOO (Anticipated Operational Occurrence) analysis of Atucha-2: DNBR reported for 
Cases A, B, C, B1 and C1 as a function of time. 
IA brought to the need to simulate all details of the Instrumentation and Control (I & C) system of the 
facility. The simulation of I & C demonstrated that results of conservative assumptions may not be 
conservative; the lowest value for DNBR was achieved when a number of components successfully operate. 
The I & C systems are (correctly) designed to keep full power following minor perturbations; however, they 
keep the potential to bring the NPP status far away from the standard operational conditions, thus opening 
for accident scenarios different from the one terminated by early scram under conservative assumptions 
(blue line, or Case C in Fig. 4).  
 
3. THE BEPU APPROACH 
On the one side, it is straightforward to discuss the outcomes of a BEPU calculation; on the other side it is 
difficult to explain what the procedure to obtain BEPU is. Hereafter some generic BEPU-definitions are 
given, D’Auria, 2017, and 2017a:  
 BEPU is a logical process or an approach which connects the understanding in nuclear reactor 
safety (see also licensing below) with nuclear thermal-hydraulics. 
 The starting point for BEPU is the understanding of the phenomena. Thus, BEPU implies the 
identification of the accident scenarios which are part of the ‘design basis envelope’.  
 BEPU implies the existence of qualified computational tools including numerical codes dealing 
with different disciplines, input decks or nodalizations and a method to evaluate the 
uncertainty. The words ‘different disciplines’ imply the coupling among codes and the ability to 
qualify the resulting coupled codes. 
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 BEPU needs the existence of qualified procedures for the application of the computational 
tools. 
 BEPU needs qualified code users and experts capable of evaluating the results and of 
establishing whether additional analyses are needed.  
 BEPU needs the existence of ’legal’ acceptance criteria (e.g. suitable licensing framework). 
 The application of BEPU implies the deep knowledge of the licensing process in the Country 
where the nuclear power plant will be installed and in the Country where the same plant has 
been designed. Furthermore, advancements in licensing process by different international 
institutions shall be continuously considered. 
 The structure of the FSAR must be adapted to BEPU and connections shall be identified among 
different chapters (see section 3.1 below): this is specifically true in relation to the design of the 
core, the experimental data drawn during the commissioning period of the plant and the design 
of operational and emergency procedures. 
 Any BEPU report as well as any BEPU finding should be a living document, periodically updated.     
The basic key elements of BEPU are:  
 Verification and Validation, V & V, for system codes, Glaeser, 2017. 
 Scaling in nuclear thermal-hydraulics, OECD/NEA/CSNI, 2017. 
 Code coupling, OECD/NEA, 2004. 
 Uncertainty methods and qualification, IAEA, 2008 and Glaeser, 2017. 
A summary-outline of the technological background identified by the listed references is already beyond 
the scope for the paper. Rather a few graphical representations are used to provide a look into the BEPU 
technology: 1) historical framework for BEPU; 2) coverage of accident analysis by BEPU; 3) breaking the 
barrier between PSA and DSA; 4) the BEPU database. These are given in Figures 5 to 8, respectively.  
Figure 5 shows a five decades background history for BEPU; details can be found in D’Auria, 2012. USNRC 
(Atomic Energy Commission, AEC, at the time) proposed the Interim Acceptance Criteria in 1971 for the 
design of Emergency Core Cooling Systems, ECCS. Remarkable achievements in the area of V & V came 
from OECD/NEA/CSNI activities in the 80’s also documented in a compendium of research by USNRC. The 
Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty (CSAU) effort preceded Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy 
Extrapolation (UMAE) and the statistical method based on Wilks’ formula first proposed by GRS in 
Germany. At the regulatory level, interpretations for performing accident analyses were proposed in the 
early 90’s and middle 00’s by USNRC, Regulatory Guide RG-1.157 and RG-1.203, respectively. The 
documents IAEA, 2008 and IAEA, 2010, also identify guidelines for the application of BEPU. At the level of 
demonstrating the capability of methods: a) the UMS project dealing with applicability of uncertainty 
methods was completed in the middle of 90’s; b) the capability to deal with the Internal Assessment of 
Uncertainty (IAU), i.e. to consider the deviation of a calculation compared with an experiment as an 
intrinsic feature of the code that generates the calculation, was demonstrated in the year 2000 (application 
of the CIAU method, or the Code with capability of IAU); c) the BEMUSE project to demonstrate the 
qualification of uncertainty methods was completed towards the end of 00’s. At the level of application, 
cornerstone activities were performed around 2000 and 2010, dealing with the application of BEPU to the 
analysis of Large Break Loss of Coolant for the licensing of the Angra-2 NPP in Brazil and of all accidents part 
of the FSAR Chapter 15 for the licensing of the Atucha-2 NPP in Argentina. A number of other applications 
of BEPU are mentioned by Glaeser, 2017.   
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Fig. 5 – A historical framework for BEPU. 
Figure 6 shows the applicability range for BEPU within the domain of accidents analysis with accidents 
having different severity. Accident Management area can be concerned until the situation of the core 
keeping a coolable geometry. The rigor of computational tools including the V & V procedures and the 
uncertainty methods cannot be kept in situations of degraded core, i.e. Severe Accident with Core Damage 
(CD) and Large Releases (LR). On the contrary, the ‘regions’ of control systems and safety systems are BEPU 
regions. Cross-links between BEPU region and PSA region can be derived from the reported sketch.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 – BEPU connection with risk informed accident analysis (J. Misak and M. Dusic largely contributed to this 
sketch). 
Making reference to Fig. 7, similar elements may be used to characterize both DSA and PSA pyramids, e.g. 
LOCA, Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) and Station Blackout (SBO). In the same sketch, Global 
(Safety) Margins and Core Damage Frequency (CDF) are put at the top of the pyramids, while, accident 
scenarios on the left side correspond to Fault Tree (FT), Event Tree (ET) and Human Reliability Analyses 
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Fig. 7 – Risk informed BEPU approach breaking the barrier between DSA and PSA. 
The Fig. 8 shows that databases having various origins are needed for the application of the risk informed 
BEPU approach. The word ‘database’ shall be intended as part of the knowledge management and of the 
demonstration of the expertise needed; for instance, qualification of computational tools and of analysts 
shall be performed using suitable data; reference data (the ‘best’ available) are needed to perform PSA 
applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 – The database for BEPU. 
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3.1 The BEPU-FSAR 
Industrial applications of BEPU are limited to the area of accident analysis in NRS, see also Fig. 5. The 
feasibility of the application of BEPU methods to any area of NRS where analytical techniques are used has 
been recently investigated, Menzel et al., 2015 and 2016. A systematic overview of the content of the FSAR 
allowed the characterization of a list of ‘key disciplines’ and related computational tools. The proposed idea 
is to apply BEPU methods to each step of FSAR, i.e. creating the BEPU-FSAR.  
The possible exploitation of the BEPU-FSAR requires an industrial and/or applied R & D effort beyond the 
boundaries of the activities performed so far (i.e. cited references and present paper). However, the 
following benefits are expected from the implementation: 
 To make uniform the quality of analyses throughout FSAR: for instance, quality of database and 
computational tools and related impact upon consequential uncertainties in the safety 
evaluation shall be the consistent for:   
a) demonstrating the compliance of civil structures with requirements, 
b) calculating the probability and the consequence of Postulated Initiating Events (PIE) 
including external events, see Fig. 6,   
c) performing accident analysis, i.e. a situation where BEPU is applied and the environment 
where BEPU is developed. 
 To break the barriers between ‘neighboring’ disciplines relevant to design and safety evaluation 
for NPP (i.e. in addition to breaking the barrier between DSA and PSA already discussed).  For 
instance, should an earthquake occur, propagation of waves into ground, soil structure 
interaction, influence of close structures on the site, loads on mechanical structures like 
containment and pressure boundary for Reactor Coolant System, possible pipe break and 
consequential missile generation, jet thrust, jet impingement, pipe whip are all treated step-by-
step and separately. Current (BE) computational technology allows an integrated approach 
where actual feedbacks are modeled. 
 To introduce a rationale for the classification of the safety importance of systems, components 
and structures. In other terms, the current quality classification should be based upon BE 
analyses which take into account continuously advancing boundary of knowledge, the lifetime of 
those systems and components and the actual timing of an event: for instance a system which is 
unimportant for safety during nominal operating conditions may become of outmost importance 
because of (minor) failures occurred during a concerned transient.  
 To contribute to the objective of a uniform qualification level for personnel involved with the 
NPP, design construction and operation. BEPU procedures can be used to qualify technicians 
working in different sectors of nuclear technology. BEPU techniques may help in fixing 
homogeneous criteria for training in relation to various NPP related topics, see e.g. the NUTEMA, 
BEPU based knowledge management facility, D’Auria et al., 2011. 
 To evaluate thoroughly the innovation introduced in the design of NPP, namely of systems and 
components relevant to NRS. One example is constituted by the passive systems: an error in the 
angle of the axis +/- 1% related to the horizontal plane has no effect in case centrifugal pump 
drives the flow. The same error may largely affect the performance of a passive system, i.e. Jafari 
et al., 2003. Calculating the reliability of a passive system implies coupling of methods and data 
from thermal-hydraulics, structural mechanics, construction techniques and reliability, i.e. the 
domain of BEPU-FSAR. 
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 To contribute to a systematic and comprehensive identification and classification of the E-SM, as 
discussed with more details in sections 2.2.1 and 4.1 of the present paper.    
 
4. COMBINING ALARA, BEPU-FSAR, IA AND E-SM 
The outlines provided for ALARA, SM and E-SM, BEPU and BEPU-FSAR and IA are embraced hereafter in the 
attempt to identify a worthwhile path in NRS. A humble sketch for the path can be seen in Fig. 9. Related to 
the elements in the sketch, in addition to the legend, the following statements apply:      
 NPP Unit, NRS requirements and FSAR constitute part of established technology not discussed in 
the paper. Namely FSAR encompasses all elements part of the picture.  
 ALARA, BEPU and SM are part of established technology outlined in the paper. 
 BEPU-FSAR and E-SM constitute proposals in this paper. 
 Independent Assessment (IA) is an established requirement: its implementation, i.e. the impact 
upon NRS applications, can be largely improved when combined with BEPU and BEPU-FSAR.  
 Additional Safety Barrier is an expected outcome discussed in section 4.1.  
The connection between IA and BEPU as well as between BEPU and SM has been outlined by D’Auria et al., 
2017, and by D’Auria et al., 2017a. Before attempting a connection among all elements, possibly identifying 
some benefits, the roles of NRS requirements and of FSAR are discussed in advance. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 – The elements for the paper and the target. 
NRS requirements are fixed by regulatory authorities (already mentioned). They are considered 
comprehensive (any related judgement is irrelevant) and do not need major modifications (eventually, any 
modification shall follow paths which are outside the domain for the paper). The requirements drive any 
process in NRS: this is the motivation for the presence in the given picture (Fig. 9). FSAR is the compendium 
of all findings from safety assessment in relation to a single NPP unit. The current structure and list of 
content of FSAR are considered adequate; however, the amount of detail and the basic methodologies of 
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the documented results shall be adapted to BEPU. The BEPU-based FSAR will continue to encompass all 
elements in the picture of Fig. 9.         
The following connections are identified. 
I) NPP unit E-SM  Additional Safety Barrier. The hardware and software of the NPP unit are 
expected to be modified to accommodate for the monitoring of ‘new’ SM. The complexity and the 
value of NPP are realized here and the proposed changes shall have negligible impact upon cost 
and complexity (see section 4.1 for the additional safety barrier).  
II) ALARA  BEPU.  ‘Making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures … as far below the … 
limits’ is translated into ‘Utilizing the best available techniques to calculate the exposure’. So BEPU 
is a consequence of ALARA and delays in exploiting its features are not justified. 
III) BEPU  BEPU-FSAR.  The possibility to perform BEPU analyses of all Design Basis Accidents (DBA) 
which are part of FSAR has been demonstrated (e.g. D’Auria et al., 2012). The applicability of BEPU 
methods and procedures like code V & V, scaling, qualification of data and of analysts, to any 
analytical part of FSAR appears straightforward and is envisaged (e.g. Menzel et al., 2016). BEPU-
FSAR appears to be the natural extension of BEPU. However, full demonstration of BEPU-FSAR 
capability requires resources which are not expected to become available without the engagement 
of industry which should be convinced in advance of the benefits of the extension.  
IV) BEPU  SM and BEPU-FSAR  E-SM. Analytical techniques applied to accident analysis can be 
used to characterize reference conditions for the operation of NPP systems called in operation in 
nominal and off-nominal situations, including so-called technical specifications (tech-spec) values. 
This applies to BEPU and to the set of variables connected with the current definition of SM. It 
appears reasonable to predict that BEPU-FSAR analyses can support the definition process for E-SM 
and contribute in fixing selected E-SM values. 
V) BEPU  IA  SM. In the item above it is clarified that BEPU can be used for the characterization of 
SM. So what is the role for IA? First, it seems important to state that ‘IA is not a process against the 
owner of data’ and that ‘IA does not imply the loss of data ownership’. Rather, properly performed 
IA has the potential to improve a design or the industrial product under concern through the use of 
procedures and tools not applied for the original design. IA is a requisite for a consistent 
(independently assessed) set of SM (and E-SM) values and related monitors.             
The full chain of elements can be generated: 
ALARABEPU (and) BEPU-FSARIA (SM and) E-SM. 
The entire process must comply with NRS requirements and be documented in the FSAR. 
4.1 The additional safety barrier 
The enemy is the radiation, so the terms Defense-in-Depth (DiD) and Safety Barriers remind us the target to 
defeat the enemy as stated in relation to the discussion of Fig. 1. At least three safety barriers are 
commonly identified and are part of current NPP configurations: the Zircaloy fuel clad, the steel pressure 
boundary for the primary system and the concrete containment. Those barriers have a static nature, 
however their integrity is ensured by systems also constituted by safety functions which have a dynamic 
nature and also may adapt to the evolution of possible accident scenarios. 
So, what are the needs and the in-principle features for an additional safety barrier? The answer as follows:  
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 The need for a new barrier should be justified by small cost and large reduction of CDF: although 
no analysis is performed, target costs and reduction in CDF for the ‘new’ barrier should be less 
than 1% the overall cost of one unit and 1-2 orders of magnitude, respectively.  
 The new barrier should be physically separated from other barriers and at the same time 
providing support to the existing barriers (not introducing new failure modes for the overall 
system):  detailed design is needed to confirm the achievement of this goal.    
The elements of the ‘additional’ proposed barrier are: 
A) The results of BEPU-FSAR analyses which are continuously updated. 
B) The installation and the operation of 104 (order of magnitude) devoted transducers. 
C) The combination of signals from transducers and the BEPU-FSAR analysis results. 
D) The availability of resources corresponding to envisaged needs, e.g. remote core rescue systems 
and operators, D’Auria et al., 2012b.     
Thus, the barrier consists of transducers, computers, computational tools (i.e. for performing analyses and 
software for data treatment and E-SM derivation) and data (i.e. continuously updated results of analysis 
and signals from transducers). 
The proposed approach has the potential to prevent the occurred nuclear catastrophes. Some examples 
are given below to clarify the features of the barrier. 
 
Example 1, the first TMI-2 case. Before the occurrence of TMI-2 event, the Pilot Operated Relief Valve 
(PORV) of pressurizer was leaking and one manual valve in Emergency Feed-Water (EFW) line was closed 
(should have been open). Leakage from the PORV and EFW line valve are part of monitored E-SM 
quantities. Individual E-SM values associated with PORV leakage and EFW line valve closed would not cause 
any action, however the combination of those two E-SM causes ‘red signal alarm’ and scram. TMI-2 reactor 
would have been scrammed before the start of the accident.      
Example 2, the second TMI-2 case. Assume the undetected PORV stuck open occurrence: this is a 
hypothetical condition for TMI-2 event because the accident would have not been happened if the 
additional barrier was installed. One E-SM signal is the temperature in the PORV sump tank. The early 
detection of PORV stuck open would have prevented any core damage. 
Example 3, the Chernobyl case. The misconduct of operators 5-10 hours (various E-SM involved) prior to 
the explosion would have created various ‘red signal alarms’ and scram.  The zero power situation achieved 
few minutes before the explosions would have created an ‘«extreme» red signal alarm’ with devoted scram 
not under the control of the operators. The Chernobyl accident would have not been occurred.  
Example 4, the first Fukushima case. The continuously updated BEPU-FSAR analyses would have considered 
an external PIE including 20 m (or more) tsunami wave, due to recent tsunamis like the Thailand tsunami, 
not part of the original NPP design. NPP operation would have not been allowed: ‘red signal alarm’ 
generated decades before the event. 
Example 5, the second Fukushima case. Assume the NPP was in operation under current design parameters 
at the time of the Sendai earthquake: this is a hypothetical condition for Fukushima because the units 
would have not been in operation if the additional barrier was installed, or, if they were in operation, new 
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protection systems against tsunami would have been built. Satellite detection of tsunami wave height, part 
of E-SM, would have generated an ‘«extreme» red signal alarm’ with request of substitute Emergency 
Diesel Generators, EDG. Reasonably, EDG would have not been dispatched to the site before the time when 
wave hit the site, but reasonably it would have been dispatched on time to prevent any core melt.   
Example 6, human performance and security case.  Let us consider here the event of the airplane crash in 
the French Alps occurred in 2015. Signals connected with the health of operators (the pilot in this case) and 
conditions of the cockpit (e.g. one pilot alone in the cockpit) are part of the E-SM. The combination of those 
two signals would have generated a ‘red signal alarm’ on time to prevent that tragedy.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The triggering idea for the paper is that NPP technology is stagnant and initiatives shall be undertaken to 
restore credibility from the public: the alternative is the irreversible decline of the technology. 
Furthermore: 
a) Any step in the NRS demonstration should be based upon analyses and data: this also implies that 
the fall of a meteorite should be part of the PSA; its probability value should become a target for 
the Core Damage Frequency (CDF). 
b) Consistently with the proposal of pioneers in NRS, technological achievements must be timely 
evaluated. 
c) In relation to Independent Assessment, the industry should address the dilemma ‘running the risk 
of releasing proprietary data’ or ‘decreasing (maybe down to zero) the probability to build new 
units’.     
BEPU-FSAR and E-SM constitute the two-tier integrated proposal for improving NRS technology. 
Introducing related findings into NPP design has the potential:  
A) to create an additional safety barrier to the release of fission products; 
B) to prevent severe accident occurred so far.  
A suited cost-risk-benefit analysis is well beyond the constraints of a scientific paper: however one may 
guess that the cost of the proposed innovation shall be below 1% the cost of one individual NPP and the 
gain in terms of CDF (per year) shall be 1-2 orders of magnitude. 
The proposed additional safety barrier has a dynamic nature, which adapts to the current NPP status, 
considering the latest available information from technology 
Industry and regulators are expected to take profit from the integrated proposal. The acceptance of nuclear 
plants by the public could also improve following the implementation of independent BEPU-FSAR and E-SM. 
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